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Military matters are of  vital importance to the state, 
and may lead to survival or ruin.  
Hence they are subjects of  inquiry, 
which can on no account be neglected.
-Sun Tzu1 
In a recently published paper, authors Keir Lieber and Daryl Press pro-
vided a provocative analysis on the evolving nuclear relations of  the United 
States with Russian and China. The authors concluded that “[for] the first 
time in decades, [the United States] could conceivably disarm the long-range 
nuclear arsenals of  Russia or China with a nuclear first strike.” 2 This po-
tentially new nuclear status of  the United States is referred to as “nuclear 
primacy.” The authors also determine that U.S. nuclear primacy “may give U.S. 
leaders’ coercive leverage over adversaries in future high-stakes crises…” This 
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situation brings to mind the words of  Sun Tzu who clearly warns us that on 
military matters one should exercise extreme caution. The gravity of  strategic 
issues between nuclear powers and their implications are matters of  life and 
death; therefore, it is necessary to closely scrutinize these issues’ analysis and 
claims and to challenge the conclusions if  warranted.
In their analysis of  America’s impending nuclear primacy vis-à-vis China, 
the authors Lieber and Press are wrong in two fundamental ways. First, the 
reasoning by which they arrive at their conclusions is faulty; and second, the 
implications of  their conclusions are incorrect on several counts. The more 
serious problem arises, however, if  U.S. decision-makers believe in American 
nuclear primacy as a reality. Any action as a result of  a reliance on this false 
belief  would lead to disaster for America and the rest of  the world.
The Problem of  Intelligence 
Using their models, Lieber and Press concluded that zero Russian long-
range nuclear weapons would survive in a surprise U.S. nuclear strike. The 
sensitivity analysis in this paper suggests that the resulting “zero” target 
survivability is very robust. That is, reductions in the accuracy and reliability 
of  U.S. nuclear weapons as well as a further hardening of  Russian silos would 
still not alter the expected zero survivability. As for China, which has far fewer 
nuclear weapons than Russia, the United States would be able to eliminate all 
of  China’s nuclear weapons with even greater certainty in a surprise nuclear 
strike. Furthermore, the authors contend that America has a distinct technical 
edge over Russia and China in nuclear weaponry, ensuring that zero target 
survivability will be unchangeable for the foreseeable future. On the other 
hand, the uncertainties raised in their thesis are minor; suggesting for instance 
that a U.S. submarine commander might not receive, or might not believe, 
his launch orders. However, they conclude with the warning that it would be 
unwise for Russia and China to pin their hopes on enemy weapons platforms 
underperforming.
The authors’ calculations are not surprising. Basic arithmetic alone will 
certify that thousands of  nuclear missiles should be able to destroy a couple 
dozen immobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). But this calculus 
has existed for a long time. The authors would have done better to question 
why they are the first to discuss China’s vulnerability to zero target surviv-
ability. The Chinese leaders do not feel a sense of  panic about the scarcity of  
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Chinese immobile ICBMs and do not rush to increase their number when in 
fact they have the capability and the means to do so. Why, the authors might 
have asked themselves, does China remain comfortable with its small and 
low-alert nuclear arsenal? As Lieber and Press state in their paper:
“…[China’s] strategic arsenal is growing at a glacial pace. China has 
only 18 ICBMs, a number that has remained essentially unchanged for 
more than a decade. In addition, these missiles are kept un-fueled, and 
their warheads are stored separately.” 
Rather than exploring why China chooses to do so, Lieber and Press use 
this fact as evidence to support their point on U.S. nuclear primacy.3 If  the 
authors paid more heed to China’s choice of  a small and low-alert nuclear 
arsenal they would find their deductions faulty, including technical problems 
in their calculations. All the calculations in their paper, including the sensitiv-
ity analyses, focus on the hardness of  the targets as well as strike capabilities, 
which are determined by the lethal distance, accuracy, and reliability of  U.S. 
nuclear weapons. However, the calculations in the paper are based on a fun-
damentally unrealistic assumption: that is, the United States can detect and 
locate all Russian and Chinese long-range nuclear weapons. The authors never 
state this assumption in their paper – perhaps unknowingly so, as most former 
calculations do not discuss the issue of  target detection. In other previous 
studies, where the numbers of  surviving nuclear weapons in a calculation are 
much larger than zero, it may be alright to ignore the factor of  intelligence. 
But, if  such a calculation gives a result of  
almost zero surviving targets in a nuclear 
exchange, the intelligence factor becomes 
highly salient and therefore cannot be 
ignored.
The authors understand that “… one 
surviving mobile ICBM might destroy a 
U.S. city …” So their sensitivity analysis 
tries to prove that no single Russian long-
range nuclear weapon can survive even if  the U.S. nuclear weapons are not as 
effective as assumed. However, the real problem is that if  the United States 
does not know where some nuclear weapons are in Russia or China, the United 
With near zero 
surviving targets in 
a nuclear exchange, 
the intelligence factor 
becomes highly salient.
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States cannot destroy them even with superior numbers and performance of  
nuclear weapons.
It is instructive to know that once the Soviet Union (and later, Russia) 
felt that it had a sufficient number of  nuclear weapons to survive a first U.S. 
nuclear strike, it chose to sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START) 
I and II that entail on-site inspections to verify the numbers and locations of  
the Russian long-range nuclear weapons. If  Russia feels that not a single one 
of  its nuclear weapons can survive a first strike by the United States, it may 
consider not revealing all its nuclear weapons to the United States. In fact, 
unlike the START treaties, the new Moscow Treaty does not require similar 
on-site inspections. 
It is evident, even more so in China’s case, that it has never declared the 
number or location of  its nuclear weapons. Naturally, the United States relies 
on its intelligence to identify and locate China’s nuclear weapons and then 
uses this information to decipher which objects and how many objects appear 
to be nuclear weapons and where they are located. The calculations in their 
paper do prove that the United States can destroy all the objects that have 
been identified by U.S. intelligence as nuclear weapons. However, the paper 
misses the central point of  whether the entirety of  Chinese long-range nuclear 
weapons have been identified and located by U.S. intelligence or whether all 
the objects that are identified in China are real nuclear weapons. The paper 
simply omits possible deficiencies of  intelligence. 
Furthermore, the performance of  U.S. intelligence in the first Iraq war 
and the Kosovo war suggests that the United States may miss more than 
just a few large military targets. Technically speaking, it is a relatively simple 
countermeasure for China to conceal a few actual ICBMs and to deploy decoy 
missiles – given the large size of  the Chinese territory. No matter how the 
United States increases the number, accuracy, and reliability of  its nuclear 
weapons, even if  used in a surprise attack, it has no means of  destroying those 
Chinese ICBMs that its intelligence has not found. Thus, there is no method 
or model by which Lieber and Press can determine with any certainty that the 
number of  surviving Chinese ICBMs after a surprise U.S. strike (equal to the 
number of  undetected Chinese ICBMs) will be zero, and it seems far more 
likely survivability would be greater than zero. The definitive conclusion that 
the surviving Chinese ICBMs must be zero is technically wrong as it omits the 
intelligence deficiency. 
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The uncertainties of  the calculations in the paper are much greater and 
much more serious than indicated by the authors, and certainly goes beyond 
their single scenario of  an enemy target surviving because a U.S. submarine 
commander does not believe his launch order. However, the greatest concern 
is that U.S. leaders actually believe that zero retaliation from China is possible, 
as predicted by Lieber and Press, and behave incautiously. Zero retaliation 
is an illusion, and if  taken seriously it would bring dire risks to the United 
States. 
The Conditions of  Coercion 
The Lieber and Press thesis speculates that the United States may attain 
coercive power over its adversaries in a crisis if  a position of  nuclear primacy 
is achieved. The paper, however, does not explain how the United States 
would transfer its superior nuclear position into signals of  threat in order to 
coerce others. Let us be very clear that it is thoroughly implausible that the 
United States would use its nuclear weapons to force other countries to yield 
to it in economic, social or cultural disputes. If  it chose to do so, it would 
fail for two basic reasons. First, power and influence generated in one realm 
(nuclear primacy) is not necessarily transferable to another realm (economic 
or other). Second, the threat of  using nuclear weapons for such ends would be 
abhorrent to Americans and the world. Rather, the coercive power of  nuclear 
weapons, if  real, should be effective only in serious security disputes - and are 
therefore the only scope for discussion. Moreover, if  Lieber and Press expect 
that nuclear primacy enables the United States to coerce other countries in 
security disputes, they need to explain how the United States would send 
coercive signals and how its rivals would interpret the signals.
In a scenario where the goal of  the United States is to force a country to 
yield in a security dispute using the fear of  American nuclear superiority, an 
important question arises: how would a country know whether the nuclear 
threats from the United States are real and consequently whether to withdraw 
from their previous position? The United States would need to make known 
at a certain stage in the dispute: (1) its security objectives in relation to its 
adversary; and (2) the threat of  possibly using nuclear weapons against its 
adversary if  it does not yield its position. The response by the adversary is 
important here for it may or may not take seriously the nuclear threats by 
the United States. If  the adversary does not take such threats seriously, then 
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they would not feel the necessity to yield and therefore coercion would not 
work. To clearly reveal its security objectives and convince its adversary that 
the nuclear threat is credible, the United States would have to send out very 
strong signals of  threat, for example, upgrading its nuclear readiness. If  the 
adversary does take the U.S. nuclear threat seriously, it can raise its nuclear alert 
accordingly and thereby increase the survivability of  its nuclear weapons. 
Preemption or Prevention
The Lieber and Press paper tries to prove that the United States can destroy 
all Russian or Chinese long-range nuclear weapons in a surprise preventive 
nuclear strike in peacetime. But in any security dispute some form of  threat 
signaling is necessary. For example, after Russia receives strong signals of  
a nuclear threat from the United States, it may disperse its mobile ICBMs 
and nuclear submarines or launch its silo-based ICBMs when its early warn-
ing systems detect even unclear signals of  incoming warheads. China may 
relocate its cave-based ICBMs when it interprets strong nuclear signals by the 
United States. These efforts can reduce the effectiveness of  the preemptive 
U.S. nuclear strike and therefore make the number of  survivable Russian and 
Chinese long-range nuclear weapons greater than zero. In fact, the authors 
acknowledge that “(a) preemptive strike 
on an alerted Russian arsenal would still 
likely fail, but a surprise attack at peace-
time alert levels would have a reasonable 
chance of  success.” 
In this way, the United States faces 
a dilemma: ensuring that not a single 
Russian or Chinese long-range nuclear 
weapon survives its nuclear strike can only 
be achieved in the absence of  an alert and therefore nuclear coercion cannot 
work. On the other hand, if  it wants to coerce Russia or China in a serious 
security dispute, it needs to send very strong signals of  nuclear threat that 
would invariably reduce the effectiveness of  its nuclear strike and therefore 
undermine its coercive power. To solve this dilemma, the United States needs 
to develop a fully disarming capability of  preemptive nuclear strike in crises, 
not only a fully disarming capability of  preventive nuclear strike in peace-
time. The Lieber and Press paper mistakenly links the preventive capability 
How would the U.S. 
would send coercive 
signals and how would its 
rivals interpret 
the signals.
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in peacetime to coercive power in crises. This is misleading. Coercive power 
in crises, if  real, should mainly come from preemptive strike capability, along 
with serious threat signals beforehand. 
It could be true that preventive capability in peacetime might create co-
ercive power in dissuading nuclear proliferation. The expectation in such a 
scenario would be that the United States could launch a surprise nuclear strike 
against the emerging nuclear state in peacetime and destroy all the components 
of  its nuclear program. If  the emerging nuclear state has no way to hide its 
nuclear components and worries about the consequences of  a strike, it might 
be persuaded to give up development of  a nuclear weapons program. Even 
if  the United States could achieve this dissuasive ability, however, it cannot 
be applied to Russia or China as they have been beyond this stage for a long 
time. 
The relation between the levels of  disarming capability and the types of  
coercive power is illustrated in Figure 1. The disarming capability of  preemp-
tive strike in crisis may help build coercive power in crisis while a disarming 
capability of  preventive strike in peacetime may help build nonproliferation 
coercive power in peacetime. The two forms of  coercive power lie in different 
realms. 
Figure 1: Levels of  Disarming Capability and Forms of  Coercive Power
As Lieber and Press suggest, some believe it may be an attractive goal 
for the United States to develop coercive power over Russia and China in a 
crisis. However, this kind of  coercive power requires a disarming capability 
of  preemptive strike in crisis, which is much more difficult than the disarming 
capability of  surprise strike in peacetime, as calculated in the paper. In a crisis, 
adversaries can raise the survivability of  their retaliatory weapons by raising 
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the alert status of  these weapons. Thus, the United States would not have the 
coercive power suggested by the paper unless it raises its strike capability to a 
much higher level.
New Nuclear Coercive Power?
Lieber and Press largely circumvent a discussion about what the United 
States would actually do if  its leaders believed that it had achieved nuclear 
primacy. Throughout the paper, the authors suggest that the United States 
may only make use of  the influence gained by nuclear primacy without actu-
ally launching the weapons. On the other hand, in the section where they 
criticize the constructivist’s nuclear taboo theory, the authors try to prove that 
U.S. leaders can certainly launch a nuclear attack if  the coercive goal cannot 
be reached. These incompatible arguments are understandable. The taboo 
against using nuclear weapons, as a social norm, is deeply embedded in modern 
society. 4 People who accept the norm feel deep unease, even guilt, with the 
mere suggestion of  the use of  nuclear weapons. The undertones throughout 
the paper clearly reveal a sense of  disquietude regarding the use of  nuclear 
weapons even though they criticize the theory of  nuclear taboo. They avoid 
directly suggesting that the United States would launch a nuclear attack if  the 
coercion fails. But if  the United States does not plan to launch nuclear attacks 
after its coercion fails, the coercion would be non-credible and could not 
work. According to Kissinger’s measurement of  deterrence, a special kind of  
coercion, the effectiveness of  coercion depends not only on the strength of  
the force but also the determination to use force. 5 To prove that the United 
States can build coercive leverage based 
on its nuclear primacy, the paper needs to 
convince people that the United States has 
the determination to use its nuclear force 
if  coercion fails.
A question might arise as to whether 
the Chinese should be frightened by the 
threat of  nuclear attack from the United 
States in any scenario where the United States sends a new coercive signal. 
If  the United States would use nuclear weapons after its coercion fails, then 
the Chinese might believe that U.S. nuclear weapons are not a paper tiger, but 
the real thing. If  not, U.S. nuclear weapons capability, even in a position of  
The authors mistakenly 
link preventive capability 
in peacetime to coercive 
power in crisis.
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primacy, remains a paper tiger, even though it may have whiter teeth, as the 
metaphor goes. Whether nuclear weapons will be used in a given situation 
depends on many factors. Certainly, there is no doubt that the United States 
will launch a nuclear retaliatory strike if  the United States or one of  its close 
allies comes under nuclear attack. This is 
the so-called minimum nuclear deterrence 
and extended deterrence to its allies. 
The Lieber and Press paper also raises 
the concern that China might use nuclear 
weapons to destroy American cities if  the 
United States supports the separatists in 
Taiwan in a war for separation, a suggestion 
which arose from a Chinese military scholar. 6 In fact, a more accurate inter-
pretation of  this comment is that China could extend its nuclear deterrence 
to dissuade mass conventional attack from the United States in a Sino-U.S. 
war over Taiwan. The idea is that China could compensate for its conven-
tional inferiority vis-à-vis the United States by adding the influence of  nuclear 
weapons. However, the United States should not be concerned about this for 
two reasons. First, China’s leaders fully understand that nuclear weapons are 
a paper tiger in this kind of  conventional conflict. No matter who is defeated 
in conventional war (if  it ever came to that), neither China nor the United 
States would be able to alter the outcome using nuclear weapons. The second 
reason is that to deter a nuclear attack (minimum deterrence) does not require 
nuclear primacy. A retaliatory nuclear force larger than the base criterion 
described by Robert McNamara should be sufficient for this purpose.7 The 
coercive power of  minimum nuclear deterrence (deterring others from using 
nuclear weapons) has been held by the United States for over half  a century. 
If  the United States would achieve nuclear primacy today, it would make little 
contribution to the U.S. minimum nuclear deterrence. 
Lieber and Press seem to suggest that the United States has some new kind 
of  coercive power, but they do not specify what that new power is. The paper 
correctly asserts that the U.S. disarming capability of  surprise nuclear attack 
in peacetime may worsen the dynamic of  nuclear escalation. As noted above, 
raising alert levels of  China’s (or Russia’s) nuclear force would be decisive for 
its survivability and so the incentive to do so under the conditions of  nuclear 
primacy would be strong. Consequently, U.S. nuclear primacy has a strong 
negative effect on controlling nuclear escalation. 
U.S. nuclear primacy has 
a strong negative effect 
on controlling nuclear 
escalation.
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There are two kinds of  coercive power that might be new and relevant to 
China. The first is an extended deterrent power that aims to dissuade China 
from punishing separatists in Taiwan and/or stop China from heavily beating 
U.S. conventional forces involved in the war. If  the United States has any 
coercive power over China on the Taiwan issue it comes from U.S. economic 
and conventional superiority over China rather than nuclear dominance. U.S. 
nuclear superiority has never and will never stop China from defending its 
security interests. The United States once sent coercive signals to China dur-
ing the Korean War threatening the use of  nuclear weapons. China’s leader at 
the time, Mao Zedong, simply treated the threatening signals as a paper tiger, 
believing nuclear weapons could not be used. 8 America’s nuclear primacy 
at that time did not, either through the physical effects of  nuclear weapons 
or their influence, stop China from sending military forces to the Korean 
Peninsula to resist the advance of  the U.S. military. If  the United States expects 
that its nuclear primacy would deter China from responding to the separation 
of  Taiwan from China or from fighting against foreign military interference, 
it will be making a grave mistake. In addition, U.S. leaders will find that the 
nuclear taboo, in the sense of  opposition 
to nuclear war from American people and 
the rest of  the world, will bind them from 
acting on their nuclear threats in such a 
conventional conflict. 
The second possible new form of  coer-
cive power is nuclear compellence, which 
in this scenario would presumably force 
China to accept an arrangement over Taiwan favorable to the United States. 
However, it is far more difficult to achieve a goal by nuclear compellence 
than nuclear deterrence. 9 As noted above, the United States has little ability 
through nuclear deterrent power to dissuade China from militarily responding 
to an act of  separation in Taiwan. It would have even less coercive power for 
compellence over China’s interests and behavior with regard to the Taiwan 
issue. 
Press and Lieber expect that U.S. nuclear primacy would provide it a new 
coercive power. As the paper does not provide convincing arguments that the 
United States would be more determined to a launch nuclear attack when and 
if  its new forms of  coercions fail (as described above), there is little evidence 
U.S. nuclear superiority 
will never stop China 
from defending its 
security interests.
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to conclude that the United States would have any new effective coercive 
power over China on the Taiwan issue.  
The power pattern in the world has significantly changed since the end of  
the cold war. The United States is indeed in a new period of  power expansion. 
However, nuclear weapons of  the United States provide little contribution to 
its fast growing power. Lieber and Press are therefore wrong to predict that the 
United States would gain new coercive power. First, the United States cannot 
develop a fully disarming nuclear strike capability against Russia and China 
given its intelligence deficiency; second, a disarming capability of  surprise at-
tack in peacetime cannot generate coercive power in crisis given the difficulty 
of  signaling; third, the United States cannot gain new nuclear coercive power 
as its new methods of  using nuclear weapons are constrained by the nuclear 
taboo. In this new era, nuclear weapons essentially remain a paper tiger. U.S. 
nuclear modernization toward greater strike capability is just a whitening of  
the paper tiger’s teeth. If  more people in the world today understood that this 
fundamental nature of  nuclear weapons will remain unchanged, even with 
the rise of  American nuclear strike capabilities, we might still avoid the re-
emergence of  the Cold War’s worst nightmare scenarios. 
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